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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a great deal of recent media coverage and 
discussion in international diplomatic circles of a coming (or rapidly 
accelerating) global artificial intelligence (AI) arms race. The phrase 
reached prominence in the U.S. and European media flurry following 
an Associated Press report on a speech by Vladimir Putin on 
September 1, 2017.1 In that speech, an “Open Lesson” broadcast to 
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over one million Russian schoolchildren on their first day of school, he 
said that “The one who becomes the leader in this sphere will be the 
ruler of the world.”2 While these comments could be argued to have 
been taken out of context—Putin continues by saying that Russia 
would share AI knowledge rather than monopolize it as they share 
nuclear technology—it is clear that the media was ready to quickly 
extrapolate these comments as acknowledging a previously unspoken 
arms race for AI. Wired ran their story on the September speech with 
the headline “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New 
Global Arms Race,”3 while just two months later CNN ran a story with 
the headline “US Risks Losing Artificial Intelligence Arms Race to 
China and Russia,”4 and the World Economic Forum ran an article 
entitled “Artificial Intelligence is now an Arms Race. What if the bad 
guys win?”5  
There is surely a complex story as to why the media was so readily 
primed for such sensationalism, one which involves Silicon Valley 
companies making massive investments into AI; the rising global 
                                                                                                                  
Society, Stanford Law School. This paper was originally presented at the National Security, 
Emerging Technologies and the Law Conference, American Bar Association SCOLANS, 
Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, March 23, 2018.  
1 Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World, AP Nᴇᴡs (Sep. 1, 2017), 
https://www.apnews.com/bb5628f2a7424a10b3e38b07f4eb90d4 
[https://perma.cc/CP73-5Z7H]; James Vincent, Putin Says the Nation That Leads in AI 
‘Will Be the Ruler of the World’, The Verge (Sep. 4, 2017), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/72SD-SAQQ]; President Vladimir Putin, ‘Whoever leads in AI will rule 
the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day, RT (Sep. 1, 2017), (transcript 
available at https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-:putin/ 
[https://perma.cc/GF6S-XADG]. 
2 Id.; President Vladimir Putin, National Open Lesson Russia Focused on the Future, (Sep. 
1, 2017), (transcript available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/55493 
[https://perma.cc/N3BX-9Q74]). 
3 Tom Simonite, For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, 
Wɪʀᴇᴅ (Sep. 8, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-
intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/ [https://perma.cc/T4KL-LANN]. 
4 Zachary Cohen, US Risks Losing Artificial Intelligence Arms Race to China and Russia, 
CNN (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/us-military-artificial-
intelligence-russia-china/index.html [https://perma.cc/D37Q-33LB]. 
5 Mark Hughes, Artificial Intelligence is Now an Arms Race. What if the Bad Guys Win?, 
Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Fᴏʀᴜᴍ (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/cybersecurity-artificial-intelligence-arms-
race/ [https://perma.cc/H9AK-DT96]. 
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competition for AI talent; a similar resurgent interest in AI at the 
Pentagon; the rise of international cyberattacks and the serious risks 
posed by cyberwarfare; the steady stream of revelations regarding 
Russia’s use of social media to interfere in the U.S. elections as well as 
those of European states; and the rise of China as a serious economic 
competitor in the application of AI to Big Data.  
But what do we really mean when we talk about an “AI Arms 
Race?” And what is at stake in “losing” such an arms race? This paper 
will examine several ways of interpreting this phrase, drawn from 
various definitions of both “arms races” and “AI”– both of which lack 
a precise technical definition applicable to the kind of broad global 
phenomena referred to by media coverage. A better understanding of 
what this means, or might mean, can help both separate the hype from 
the real issues, as well as help us to focus on what aspects of AI pose 
serious risks to national security in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
Towards that end, the paper will start by reviewing some of the 
most common meanings of the terms “arms race” and “AI,” and then 
review several of the most likely meanings behind the phrase “AI arms 
race” in its current usage. It is the conclusion of this paper that the 
phrase combines multiple meanings, some of which may be 
contradictory, and we should really focus on the separate underlying 
concerns, rather than adopt an umbrella term that confuses rather 
than clarifies the issues. 
II. WHAT IS AN “ARMS RACE”?
The traditional notion of an “arms race” has no widely agreed 
upon definition, but is used in international relations to refer to a 
competition between two or more states in the development and 
production of military arms.6 This is generally understood to take the 
form of one-upmanship in which each side seeks an incremental gain 
over the others in terms of either technical superiority (quality) 
and/or number (quantity) of weapons over their competitors. The 
sought-after advantage in military superiority can be an overall 
strategic advantage, or a tactical advantage in an area with strategic 
significance. The consequences of an arms race are generally viewed 
as negative insofar as it is at best expensive and self-defeating, and at 
6 Dᴀᴠɪᴅ Aᴛᴋɪɴsᴏɴ, Aʀᴍs Rᴀᴄᴇs, Oxford Bibliographies (database updated Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-
9780199743292-0002.xml [https://perma.cc/HGT2-3CCF]. 
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worst destabilizing, counter-productive, or even catastrophic.7 But 
there remains some debate as to whether arms races are the 
consequence of geo-political instability or a cause of it. It could be 
argued that both views are correct insofar as both are involved in a 
positive feedback loop, or vicious cycle, of increasing instability and 
increasing arms investments, which serve to drive each other. 
A more technical definition of an “arms race” comes from game 
theoretic analysis. In applying game theory to international relations, 
one can frame arms races as a form of the prisoner’s dilemma. That is, 
it is actually in the (economic) interest of each state to not spend 
additional resources on arms, yet failing to do so in the event that 
their competitor does invest in arms has a large downside. In the 
absence of cooperation, both sides acting in their own narrow self-
interest are worse off than they would be if they could cooperate (such 
as forming a treaty or otherwise trusting each other not to build up 
arms). 
Evolutionary biology has also adopted and applied the concept of 
an “arms race.” Starting with Van Valen’s Red Queen Hypothesis,8 
biologists have sought to explain the evolution of species' traits 
through their competitions with other species. In the original 
hypothesis, the incremental advantages gained by a species over time 
through natural selection tend to be matched by the gains made by 
other competing species in their ecosystem. Thus, even though rabbits 
evolve to be faster, as the slower ones are less likely to reproduce, the 
foxes who prey on them also evolve to become faster. Thus, the traits 
of both species can evolve in relation to each other, even while the 
population sizes remain relatively stable over time. The original idea 
of the Red Queen Hypothesis is taken from Alice Through the Looking 
Glass, where in her chess game with the Red Queen, Alice had to keep 
running just to stay in place.9 Sometimes these evolved traits follow a 
single path, leading to extreme biological forms. And so it can be with 
species getting ever fitter to their environment, while their ecological 
competitors similarly co-evolve resulting in extreme traits and little 
net gain. It is interesting to reapply the Red Queen hypothesis to 
military arms races, as it suggests that even as competing states invest 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, PUBLIC POLICY, vol. 8 
(1958) pp. 41-86. 
8 Leigh Van Valen, A New Evolutionary Law, 1 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1, 21 (1973). 
9 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 11-12 (17th ed. 1994). 
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heavily in arms for incremental advantages, over time the relative 
military advantages disappear. 
III. WHAT IS “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE”?
The definition of artificial intelligence (“AI”) has been 
controversial for decades. Initially, when John McCarthy coined the 
term in 1956, it was meant to describe the work of a varied group of 
researchers. The common thread of their work was developing 
computer programs to perform tasks that were generally assumed to 
require human intelligence. Over time, this proved to be something of 
a moving target; as computers regularly achieved new performances, 
the scope of what requires human intelligence has shifted. As the 
algorithms developed by AI researchers became widely used, they 
were simply treated like other software techniques rather than being 
thought of as a special category of AI.10 
Still, as a scientific and engineering discipline, AI has an 
identifiable history, along with an identifiable set of approaches, goals, 
methods, techniques, and algorithms. AI researchers have continued 
to explore various mathematical models for representing problems in 
computers, and algorithms for finding useful solutions in these 
models. While their approaches take many forms, they are all 
subsumed under the idea that intelligent action to solve a problem in a 
domain can be modeled mathematically, and that computers can 
effectively solve problems within those mathematical models. The 
various approaches are typically distinguished by their models. Even 
though the types of mathematics used to model problems is incredibly 
diverse, it mostly breaks down into two main types (and many 
hybrids) of logical and statistical approaches. Logical approaches 
attempt to encode the structure of a problem space in logical 
expressions and draw solutions from logical inference (deduction). 
Statistical approaches attempt to structure problems as parameterized 
datasets and draw their solutions from statistical inference 
(induction/prediction). And while AI has found success in solving 
10 Consider the algorithms that find the shortest path to your destination in a navigation 
application like Google Maps. This problem can be represented as a weighted graph theory 
problem and tackled by a variety of AI and other techniques, including A*, though we 
rarely think of it as “AI.” 
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problems from checkers and chess, to speech and image pattern 
recognition, it has also gone through periods of hype and decline. 
But it seems a bit silly to think that there might be a global arms 
race amongst the great powers to devise the best logical and statistical 
modeling techniques. Just substituting the word “math” for “AI” in the 
recent headlines above helps to highlight why there may be hype 
around “AI arms races,” but not “math arms races.” The public clearly 
associates something more than the underlying mathematical 
techniques to AI. 
Of course, public opinion and popular media is often informed as 
much by science fiction as it is by science. Consequently, there are 
many ideas about what AI is that are drawn from science fiction 
literature, film and television. AI in science fiction is something more 
like an artificial conscious being, which might embody a computer,11 
robot,12 building or spaceship,13 live in digital networks,14 or even 
transcend embodiment altogether.15 While science fiction can be a 
culturally rich way of engaging with contemporary and possible future 
forms of society and modes of technology, most researchers and 
governments are not seriously concerned about this kind of AI, at least 
in the near future. 
Closely related to the science fiction view of AI is the recent 
interest in Super Intelligence, or Artificial General Intelligence 
("AGI"). The idea of AGI is that advances in AI research could result in 
a system that has intelligence that exceeds human capability not just 
in one specialized area (like chess) but in a broad array of domains, or 
in general. That is, right now you can buy a computer program that 
will beat you in chess, even if you are a grand champion player. But no 
one worries about that program doing anything other than playing 
11 COLOSSUS: THE FORBIN PROJECT (Universal Pictures 1970); WARGAMES (United Artists 
1983). 
12 BLADE RUNNER (The Ladd Company, Shaw Brothers, & Blade Runner Partnership 1982); 
SHORT CIRCUIT (TriStar Pictures 1986); Sᴛᴀʀ Tʀᴇᴋ: Tʜᴇ Nᴇxᴛ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (Paramount 
Domestic Television 1987-1994); AUTOMATA (Nu Boyana & Green Moon Espana 2014); EX 
MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2014). 
13 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Stanley Kubrick Productions 1968); DEMON SEED (Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer & Herb Jaffe Productions 1977); I, ROBOT (20th Century Fox 2004). 
14 WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER, (Ace, 1984); THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984); 
THE LAWNMOWER MAN (New Line Cinema 1992). 
15 GHOST IN THE SHELL (Kodansha 1995); TRANSCENDENCE (Warner Bros. Pictures 2014). 
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chess, much less that it might become conscious or seek world 
domination. An AGI or Super Intelligence, on the other hand, might 
devise its own goals, or develop its own understanding of the world in 
such a rapid and vast way that humans might no longer be able to 
predict or control it. While devoting some effort to mitigating such an 
existential risk might be prudent, the predictions of the likelihood of 
such a development vary widely, and its consequences are largely 
speculative. For our purposes, this does not seem to be the type of AI 
that concerns diplomats and the media—even if it provides fuel for the 
media’s sensationalism around AI arms races.  
If we follow the long history of AI hype and decline cycles up to the 
most recent peaks of hype, we find a technique called Deep Learning. 
Deep Learning applies machine learning to large datasets using 
decades-old techniques of neural networks and convolution. The real 
breakthrough that has occurred in recent years is not so much a novel 
technique or algorithm, but a combination of factors, which suddenly 
made existing techniques practically effective for a much greater 
number of significant problems. Namely, the availability of large 
training datasets, access to powerful and inexpensive computing 
resources to researchers, including cloud computing and the use of 
graphical processing units ("GPUs") as massive parallel computers 
within desktop personal computers ("PCs"), has resulted in the ability 
to make very large neural networks (hence “Deep”) that can be trained 
with large datasets to solve practical problems. Another way to look at 
the current situation is that it has become much cheaper and easier to 
use these techniques.  
With the rise of internet usage over recent decades, especially 
more recently through smart phones and social media, a few 
companies have become massive platforms for collecting data on their 
users about an increasing variety of human activities and commercial 
services. This has also meant a massive surge in “big data” that 
includes many real-world examples of all sorts of things, from spam 
email to photos to traffic patterns to dating to shopping to voter 
behavior, that can now be easily used for training neural networks. 
The potential opportunities to exploit this data to increase economic 
efficiencies are enormous, and many parties are interested in finding 
new ways to capitalize on it–economically, politically, or otherwise.16 
16 Shoshana Zuboff in her book THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (Profile Books 
Limited, 2019) argues that this is a powerful new form of capitalism that has turned the 
personal data of the public commons into private resources for generating private wealth. 
This tends to support the view that “data is the new oil” insofar as natural resources like oil 
were not seen as valuable until technologies like the internal combustion engine and 
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AI and Deep Learning seem to offer the means of doing this, and to do 
so in an automated and scalable way, as opposed to requiring the 
labor of skilled statisticians and analysts to study datasets looking for 
useful patterns. Deep Learning is especially attractive insofar as it 
does not seem to require human engineers to really figure out the 
detailed structure of a given problem space–so long as engineers have 
a deep enough neural network and big enough dataset, they will get 
some good results. As such, much of the current hype around AI is 
really about applying Deep Learning to anything and everything to 
discover hidden patterns, optimize efficiencies, and thereby maximize 
profits.  
Other new technologies that are capturing the public imagination, 
such as voice-recognizing personal assistants, drones, self-driving cars 
and even private space flight, also draw heavily upon recent advances 
in computation, miniaturization, economies of scale in electronic 
components, and, of course, machine learning techniques. While these 
have been quite successful, they have not yet revolutionized social life 
in the way of the train, telephone, light bulb, airplane, television, or 
the Internet itself have. Yet, these AI-enabled technologies remain a 
cultural symbol for the promised power of future AI applications. 
Given the current state of the information economy, Deep Learning 
would seem to promise deep profits, and nation-states are right to pay 
attention to the profits to be made across a broad swath of industries 
and sectors, and the potential impacts on their economic 
competitiveness in global markets. 
With these various definitions of arms races and AI in mind, we 
now turn to several of the best candidates for what an “AI arms race” 
might be. Again, the view of the author is that each of these views, 
rightly or wrongly, at least partially informs the public notion of what 
an AI arms race means. After laying them out, we will consider their 
relationships to one another and what might be productively done 
about them. 
A. The AI Arms Race is an Economic Competition
The idea that there is a race to develop the most capable AI and to 
translate this into economic dominance by capturing markets, users, 
data, and customers is probably the most salient interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                  
organic chemistry devised ways to turn those resources into wealth, setting off 
international competition in the age of industrial capitalism to acquire and control those 
resources. 
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phrase. Indeed, one can look to the existing economic competition 
between Silicon Valley companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook, 
along with Amazon and Microsoft to develop AI technologies and 
acquire AI talent as just such an “arms race.” Of course, this is a 
figurative or metaphorical sense of “arms race” insofar as the 
competitors are not really building weapons or engaged in armed 
conflict.17 The competition is for markets and profits, and the 
competitors are mainly companies based in the same country. These 
companies perceive the ability to develop and deploy a specific 
technology or set of technologies as being critical for business success, 
and thus, there is a technological race underway. 
One could also look at this as a competition between the 
technology companies of different countries. To the extent that 
language barriers and the Great Firewall have created separate 
Internet ecosystems in China and the U.S., these companies mostly 
compete with each other for those customers within their own 
countries. However, U.S. and Chinese companies are directly 
competing to gain new Internet users throughout Asia, Africa and 
South America. As more of the world comes online each year, there is 
competition to bring new users from all over the globe into one sphere 
or the other of digital influence. And this is a competition not only for 
sales or users, but primarily a competition for their data. Insofar as 
the current hype around AI is really about the collection and 
utilization of big data, then the real global competition underway is to 
suck up the world’s data. And mostly, that means user data. If data is 
the new oil, then this global competition for users and their data is 
also a strategic competition between states for control of the key 
resource in the future global economy. 
It is hardly a stretch to view U.S. Internet companies and their 
Chinese competitors as being in a competition for global influence and 
17 Google recently announced it would not renew a contract with the Pentagon to use its AI 
to analyze drone footage, following pressure from employees and academics. See Kate 
Conger, Google Plans Not to Renew Its Contract for Project Maven, a Controversial 
Pentagon Drone AI Imaging Program, GIZMODO (June 1, 2018), 
https://gizmodo.com/google-plans-not-to-renew-its-contract-for-project-mave-
1826488620 [https://perma.cc/TV63-4BV4]; Amazon, Microsoft and Google are currently 
competing for the multi-billion dollar JEDI contract to provide cloud computing services to 
the Pentagon, which is deeply tied to various AI services. See Naomi Nix, Ben Brody & 
Kathleen Miller, Pentagon’s Winner-Take-All Move on Cloud Contract Expected to Favor 
Amazon, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-26/pentagon-goes-with-winner-
take-all-10-billion-cloud-contract [https://perma.cc/65MV-ZE6N]. 
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market domination. Chinese companies like Baidu, Alibaba, JD.com 
and Tencent are very much engaged in the very same technological 
competition to acquire massive amounts of users and their data, and 
to utilize AI to leverage that data for economic advantage as are 
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. In Russia, the public uses primarily 
Russian social media platforms like VK.com, OK.ru, and Rutube.ru, 
alongside U.S. platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. If we 
are indeed in a new age of surveillance capitalism, then the great 
powers are ultimately competing for access to personal data by 
becoming essential platforms and capturing market share of users 
globally. We could argue whether the “great powers” here are the 
technology companies or the nation-states with which they are 
aligned, as one could for the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch 
military in the 17th century. And if AI is the technology that amplifies 
the value and impact of all the data being collected, then it is certainly 
an integral part of this great competition, and a metaphor for one’s 
standing in that competition. 
The military metaphor only goes so far here, however. Countries 
and companies are in perpetual economic competition, sometimes 
deploying military force to protect their economic interests. The war 
metaphor further breaks down when we consider the nature of AI 
research. Most of the advances in basic AI research still occur 
primarily within academia and are shared in conferences and 
academic journals. Of course, most of the major advances in AI 
applications occur within companies and some government research 
labs– mostly because they hold the data. Even the major corporate 
players have established entities like the Partnership on AI and 
OpenAI to promote the widespread distribution of AI techniques, 
algorithms, standard data sets, and best practices.18 As such, it seems 
unlikely that any single country or company will retain a significant 
advantage due to a technological breakthrough for very long. From a 
business perspective, such innovations can result in capturing market 
shares, brand loyalty, and network effects that have longer term 
advantages. But these will not preclude others from competing with 
similar products and technologies. Significant advantages will come 
through network effects– those countries that foster more and bigger 
AI businesses, educate and train more AI researchers, invest more in 
18 See THE PARTNERSHIP ON AI, https://www.partnershiponai.org/ (last visited March 5, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/52LM-PW76]; OPEN AI, https://openai.com/ (last visited March 
5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZER8-7GZG]. 
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basic science and public works applications will inevitably be the ones 
with the best AI, and the countries that reap the greatest rewards from 
it. 
B. The AI Arms Race is a Proxy for Technical Dominance
Another way to view the AI arms race is as the space race of our 
generation. The Cold War between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. played out 
not only in real proxy wars, but also in symbolic proxy wars. One need 
not look too far to find symbolic proxy wars during the Cold War, 
from chess championships to Olympic hockey. The most spectacular 
of these was the Space Race in which the two countries sought to put 
satellites and people into space, to reach the Moon, and probe the 
planets and deep space. Of course, the technologies developed in the 
space race had many direct military applications, from 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, to supersonic aircraft, to spy 
satellites and telecommunications satellites, and a host of advanced 
sensor technologies. But these probably could have been developed 
without the cost and spectacle of the Space Race. That spectacle was 
about capturing the public imagination and demonstrating technical 
superiority over one’s competitors. As such, it was largely a cultural 
battle fought through technological innovation. 
Insofar as the AI arms race is a cultural battle to convince the 
world which country has the greatest technical prowess, and which 
country holds the keys to the technological (and economic) future, 
then this is an apt analogy. Of course, like the Space Race, the 
culturally symbolic aspect of the AI arms race does not preclude the 
application of AI to more traditional forms of economic and military 
competition. Indeed, such an AI arms race would likely entail many of 
the same dual-use capabilities and applications that motivated 
government investments in the Space Race. 
The U.S. has also worried about technological competitiveness 
with other nations along various dimensions since World War II. In 
the 1980s, there was great concern that Japanese industrial 
productivity and quality would so far outstrip the U.S. as to result in 
massive economic consequences. Coupled to this were fears of losing 
out in specific technologies, from automobiles to consumer 
electronics, and from microchips to 5th Generation computing. Similar 
fears continue today regarding U.S. competitiveness in 5th Generation 
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cellular networking,19 and to a lesser extent in solar and green energy 
technologies. Such rhetoric seems an inevitable part of mobilizing 
private capital and companies, and spurring interest and investment 
in strategic areas.  
However, the global strategic costs of “losing” such competitions 
are mostly economic and political, not military. Ultimately, what is at 
stake in such a symbolic cultural race is prestige, and perceived power 
and influence, which are somewhat intangible. The general perception 
of a nation as having technological prowess, respect, and influence has 
real political impact, but is difficult to measure or observe. But the 
economic AI competition has very little to do with the military, arms, 
or armed conflict, except as it becomes directly applied to military 
applications, or provides economic support for traditional military 
build-ups. 
C. The AI Arms Race is About Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity
Another view is that since AI is essentially software, “AI weapons” 
will be cyberweapons. Accordingly, the main strategic advantage to be 
sought for in AI developments will be in the cyber domain—the 
capture and destruction of data and control of the information 
infrastructure. As the tools, techniques, and software used in 
cyberattacks becomes increasingly intelligent by utilizing AI, it should 
become increasingly capable of overcoming defenses and having 
greater effects. Similarly, the best cybersecurity defenses against these 
cyberattacks will also depend more and more on AI. Taken together 
states will race each other for cyber-superiority by developing AI for 
both offensive and defensive capabilities. What are we to make of such 
a view? 
On the one hand, it seems obvious that cyberattacks and 
cyberdefenses will become increasingly sophisticated. And it does not 
seem improbable that various AI techniques might add to their 
sophistication and accelerate their improvement. If we take AI to 
mean “better IT/software” then this is simply a claim about the 
increasing strategic importance of tools for cyber operations. If we 
take AI to mean a specific set of computational techniques, then it 
remains to be seen how valuable those techniques are in cyber 
19 Stu Woo & Drew FitzGerald, How Cellphone Chips Became a National-Security 
Concern, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
cellphone-chips-became-a-national-security-concern-1520450817 
[https://perma.cc/JRK4-GVBR]. 
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operations. Are deep networks better at finding zero-day exploits in 
systems than humans, and are they more practical and cost effective 
to implement? 
For instance, a system could automatically scan for vulnerabilities 
in networks. Once access is gained to systems, software could 
automatically scan the system, and seek out higher levels of access, 
gather intelligence, and/or sabotage data as it goes. Of course, this is 
already what is done, but perhaps AI could improve on existing scripts 
and software. What we know from the recent history of cyberattacks is 
that the human elements are usually the weakest point in system 
security. It is often a human who is lured into clicking on malware in 
phishing attacks, or is convinced by a charming voice over the phone 
to reset passwords, that compromises system security. To the extent 
that AI could be developed to manipulate humans more effectively, or 
detect when humans may be being manipulated, then it could also be 
effective in this area. This is perhaps one of the scarier applications of 
AI– to optimize human psychological manipulation. It is already being 
used for extensively advertising, and may soon be applied to 
increasingly sophisticated spear-phishing types of operations. 
But it is hard to see how the incremental gains in cyber from 
applying AI technology could result in a dramatic strategic shift. 
Ultimately, AI is about automating human labor– in this case 
programmer and hacker labor. Perhaps in all-out cyber warfare, 
having an army of hacker-bots could be a force multiplier for a small 
but skilled set of human hackers. They might serve a similar function 
in low-intensity cyber harassment operations, but it is more difficult 
to see any strategic advantage to be gained by massive investments 
here, unless the expectation is to escalate into high-intensity cyber 
conflict, or that cyber warfare could supplant conventional warfare as 
primary in armed conflict. States likely already have the ability to 
wreak significant havoc, or even shut down, each other’s information 
infrastructures if they wanted to, without massive investments in AI. 
D. The AI Arms Race is About Weaponizing AI for Social 
Manipulation
Related to the idea of applying AI to cyberwarfare– attacking 
information networks, infrastructure and data– is to apply AI to 
information warfare and propaganda– essentially conducting 
psychological operations by shaping the information environment of 
mass media, social media, and the internet. Just as AI could be 
applied to the human engineering side of cyber operations, it could 
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also be used to shape public understanding and political action more 
generally. 
This is essentially the implication of recent revelations about for-
profit companies like Cambridge Analytica and their actions to 
influence U.S. voters through targeted advertising. Their “added 
value” to more traditional public relations and marketing strategies, is 
the claim that they developed psychological models derived from 
Facebook user profile data– essentially a basic AI technique. These 
models are claimed to reveal how best to identify persuadable voters, 
their innermost fears and desires, and thus which messages are most 
likely to influence them and how to pitch those messages for 
maximum effect. These claims should be treated cautiously, like most 
PR and advertising, in the absence of much empirical verification of 
the efficacy of the end result. Still, quite a lot can be done with very 
basic demographic information (age, gender, race, income level, home 
address) in terms of predicting political views. And much can be 
gained from the real-time measurement of user responses on 
webpages and responsive adjustments to those, such as mass-scale 
real-time A-B testing to optimize advertisements and messaging. 
These techniques will become even more powerful when integrated 
with eye-tracking technology that helps to identify and isolate the 
focus of attention of users on images and messages. Moreover, the 
filter bubbles of like-minded and socially-tied users that exist on social 
media platforms like Facebook are ideal for influence and 
manipulation by ideologically divisive tactics. 
The takeaway here is that the real or potential efficacy of 
automated mass deception relies primarily on mass data collection 
under weak or non-existent privacy controls, coupled with 
rudimentary multi-variable correlation. The actual analysis of that 
data beyond basic correlations might yield subtler or more powerful 
forms of manipulative messaging, but that is an empirical question. 
Again, what we have learned about the production of “fake news” is 
that it was largely conducted by human labor given the perverse 
incentives of social media platforms. It was less about content than 
clicks, and sensationalism and extremism are good at getting clicks. 
Automating that labor, of course, will inevitably make the production 
of such misinformation more efficient and effective. 
Russia has a known history of interfering in elections, and this 
new set of tools and platforms, coupled with cyberattacks, appears to 
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have had a significant impact on the U.S. election of 2016.20 From a 
global and national security perspective we should be just as 
concerned that such messages might come from foreign governments 
and their agents, illegal campaign operations, profit seeking 
opportunists, malevolent individuals, extremist groups, or misguided 
teenagers. Such undermining of the public sphere threatens 
democratic states regardless of the agents and aims, though the 
various agents and aims may require different types of policy 
responses. 
E. The AI Arms Race is About Weaponizing AI for Conventional 
Warfare
One of the more literal interpretations of the “AI arms race” idea is 
that this involves building “AI weapons” or weaponizing AI for 
conventional warfare. This can also be tied into two other major 
initiatives– the United Nations discussions at the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on the possible regulation of 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS or just AWS), and the 
U.S. Pentagon’s efforts to advance the “Third Offset Strategy.”21 While 
these issues may overlap in terms of hype and buzzwords, the 
underlying issues are only partially related to AI and its advance. 
In terms of the UN discussions of AWS, the issue there is really 
about the control of weapons systems, and more narrowly, the control 
of the targeting and engagement of weapons in an attack. The aim of 
the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is to ensure that there is always 
meaningful human control over the use of weapons, and that humans 
do not delegate the authority to kill to machines, or otherwise 
abrogate their legal accountability and moral responsibility.22 The 
Campaign is often mischaracterized as trying to ban a broad category 
20 Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, THE NEW YORKER 
(October 1, 2018) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-
to-swing-the-election-for-trump [https://perma.cc/LBG4-VCNQ].  
21 See THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA, 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UNOG (2018), 
https://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/7c335e71dfcb29d1c1258243
003e8724?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=6%2C3#_Section6] 
[https://perma.cc/6CM4-TAZ7]. 
22 See CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last visited 
March 5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/22FX-AASW]. 
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of technology, or non-existent weapons. But really, it is focused on 
clarifying the law and establishing norms going forward on the limits 
of machine autonomy and authority in armed conflict. 
AI, as a specific set of technologies, could be used to enable or 
enhance the autonomous functions of a weapon system, but this is not 
necessary. Very dumb and simple machines can operate 
autonomously, and there are many ways to automate targeting and 
firing that need not involve any AI techniques. Of course, AI might 
offer some elegant solutions and new capabilities for autonomy, and 
certainly the history of autonomous robotics is closely intertwined 
with AI. But the point is not really about the technologies used, but 
rather preserving human agency, authority, and accountability in the 
use of lethal force in armed conflict. How best to do this, exactly, is a 
matter of ongoing debate, and will hopefully emerge with some level 
of international consensus around a norm that could form the basis of 
a legally-binding instrument. 
AI does challenge the efforts at consensus building insofar as some 
proponents, such as Ron Arkin, have argued that AI controlled 
systems may perform much better than humans in some respects or 
domains.23 In this view, AI will be so good that we need not worry 
about autonomy in weapon systems. I have challenged this view on 
several fronts, including the fact that legal reasoning and judgment is 
not likely to be easily imitated by AI, and even if it were, it would still 
not constitute the right kind of moral or legal agent to actually take 
responsibility for its actions.24  
Moreover, there are a host of risks to automating targeting that are 
not resolved even if we imagine highly reliable systems. Among those 
are the risks of hacking and arms races, which are relevant in the 
current discussion. By automating weapons systems, one exposes 
them to the risk of unauthorized agents taking over, including AI-
enhanced cyber attacks. In this sense, meaningful human control 
23 Rᴏɴᴀʟᴅ C. Aʀᴋɪɴ, Pᴀᴛʀɪᴄᴋ Uʟᴀᴍ & Bʀɪᴛᴛᴀɴʏ Dᴜɴᴄᴀɴ, Aɴ Eᴛʜɪᴄᴀʟ Gᴏᴠᴇʀɴᴏʀ Foʀ Cᴏɴsᴛʀᴀɪɴɪɴɢ 
Lᴇᴛʜᴀʟ Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ ɪɴ ᴀɴ Aᴜᴛᴏɴᴏᴍᴏᴜs Sʏsᴛᴇᴍ: Tᴇᴄʜɴɪᴄᴀʟ Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ GIT-GVU-09-02, GA. TECH. 
UNIV. (2009), https://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/GIT-GVU-09-
02.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7RA-5V2S]. 
24 See Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Lethal Systems: Human Rights, Automation 
and the Dehumanizing of Lethal Decision-making, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS, 94 (886), Summer 2012, 687-709, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-review/review-886-new-technologies-
warfare/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/A2ZL-AS7H].  
2019] ASARO  61
could serve as a “human firewall” in the event of such cyberattacks, 
preventing weapons release.  
In terms of arms races, the retrofitting of manned weapons 
platforms into autonomous platforms, or the development of new 
autonomous weapons platforms could easily foment and feed new 
arms races. So too could the introduction of destabilizing new 
capabilities such as robotic swarms. And insofar as autonomous 
weapons could become a new form of weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD), due to the ability of an individual or small group to unleash 
mass destruction and death, they would be very politically 
destabilizing. 
F. The AI Arms Race is the Third Offset Strategy
While Deputy Defense Secretary, Bob Work promoted the 
development of advanced digital technologies as part of what he calls 
the Third Offset Strategy.25 The notion of the offset is that, while the 
U.S. has a history of trailing competing militaries, primarily the 
Chinese and Soviet militaries in terms of numbers of soldiers and 
equipment, it has historically offset that perceived deficiency through 
technological superiority—i.e. quality over quantity. The first offset 
was considered to be nuclear weapons and deterrence following the 
Second World War, while the second offset following the Vietnam War 
sought general technical superiority in terms of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, stealth, and precision guided 
munitions– each offsetting more traditional forms of numerical 
advantage.  
The focus of the third offset is on remote and autonomous 
platforms, big data and information processing, and information 
dominance. Again, most of these amount to simply applying software 
and IT solutions to military planning and operations, along with cyber 
warfare, information warfare and autonomous platforms as discussed 
above. AI, as a set of software techniques will have a place in this, but 
it is difficult to say it would be more important than the networks or 
25 Cheryl Pellerin, Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military 
Deterrence, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (October 31, 2016), 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-
strategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/ [https://perma.cc/9S2H-LQ5T]. 
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databases the Third Offset requires, which raises the question as to 
why this is an “AI arms race” and not an “IT arms race.” 
Within defense policy discussions, there is considerable hype 
around both the Third Offset Strategy and the sense that the world is 
at a critical moment in the strategic use of data and control of 
information. Of course, this was realized during the Second World 
War by cyberneticians and the architects of the information age. The 
fact that so much of the world is computerized and datafied is a direct 
result of the competition for data and information processing since 
then. Ultimately, however, the Third Offset will fail as an offset if the 
sought-after capabilities are matched by competitors, which is likely 
as it would set the conditions for an AI arms race. Thus, if the U.S. 
pursues this third offset, and other states do the same, they will all 
pour increasing economic resources into technologies with 
diminishing military returns in a classic case of the Red Queen 
hypothesis. 
G. The AI Arms Race is About Building a Super Intelligence/AGI
The concepts of Super Intelligence and Artificial General 
Intelligence are a bit fuzzy and speculative. The basic idea is that it 
might be possible to create a computational system that vastly 
outperforms humans in many, or any and all cognitive areas. Whereas 
existing AI systems can do this in limited domains, an AGI could learn 
new domains so rapidly that it could quickly outperform humans in 
many areas. The idea is fuzzy because we do not really know what it 
means or what technologies would be required to realize it. Without a 
clear understanding of how such a system might work or its contours, 
one must speculate as to what capabilities it might have and how it 
might behave. 
There could conceivably be a “race” between states to create such a 
technology. In this view, such a technology would be capable of giving 
a strategic advantage in a broad array of domains– from stock trading 
to logistics to military operations, to scientific and technological 
innovation itself. These might be completely unforeseeable until the 
AGI technology exists, and starts creating exotic new technologies. But 
it also raises a host of questions about whether it would be benevolent 
or malevolent towards its creators, what side it might take in a conflict 
or towards conflict in general, whether it might be completely 
indifferent to human concerns, or whether any of the technologies it 
might develop could or would be controlled by humans. An AGI, to 
use another cinematic reference, is a bit like the Ark of the Covenant 
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in the Indiana Jones film.26 It may or may not exist, and if it does, and 
if it is indeed powerful, it is not clear that whoever discovers it will 
manage to control it or will merely destroy themselves, and possibly 
everyone else, with it. 
IV. CONCLUSION
While there is a great deal of concern and hype around the idea of 
an “AI arms race,” a careful analysis of the ideas and notions caught 
up in this hype reveal a complex tapestry of concerns over technology 
and its role in economic, political, and military competition. It does 
not really make sense, from a policy perspective, to lump all of these 
concerns together because policies that promote success in one will 
inevitably conflict with and undermine others. Consider where 
economic and intellectual resources should be applied by states in this 
“AI arms race”. If the real arms race is about economic dominance, 
then the best AI programmers should be going into industry, and 
creating consumer and business AI applications. This is pretty much 
the case today, and as such supports the economic competition 
interpretation of the AI race over others. But if the concern is with AI 
cyber operations, or the Third Offset, then talent and resources should 
be directed there, at the expense of consumer and business 
applications. In the mobilization of a nation for war, the state 
directing resources in this way might make sense, despite its negative 
economic impacts in the short and long terms. While it makes sense 
for states to recruit small numbers of cyber warriors, few 
industrialized nations would consider conscripting computer 
programmers from successful companies into military duties. Indeed, 
employees at companies like Google are protesting their company’s 
involvement in military projects altogether.27 But clearly an AI arms 
race framed in economic terms is very different from one framed in 
military terms. And of the ultimate goal of nations is economic and 
political control, it is probably counterproductive to overinvest in 
military applications. Further, as IT platforms come to control more 
data, capture vast economic wealth and political influence, and deploy 
AI to predict and exert more control over human behavior, the 
26 RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981). 
27 Ben Tarnoff, Tech Workers Versus the Pentagon, JACOBIN (June 6, 2018), 
https://jacobinmag.com/2018/06/google-project-maven-military-tech-workers 
[https://perma.cc/GZB2-RH2C]. 
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greatest threat to the political hegemony of nation-states could 
become the technology companies themselves, rather than other 
nation-states. 
That said, there are certain policy approaches that would benefit 
both framings. Namely the promotion of computer science education 
and academic AI research. These areas already receive more funding 
than many other areas of education and research, but given the 
shortages of tech workers and academic researchers with these skills, 
and their increasing demand, this seems like the most obvious and 
effective investment states could make in this technological race. 
The deeper concerns of citizens, as well as business and political 
leaders, as to the increasing surveillance and collection of personal 
data, and its use in manipulating people for economic and political 
purposes will not be addressed or resolved by any simple policy 
solution. It is not enough to eliminate “fake news,” or enhance cyber 
security or privacy policies. The social changes being wrought by new 
technologies appear likely to accelerate rather than slow down, and a 
broad variety of policies will be needed to reign it in. Moreover, some 
of its forms, including “fake news” and information manipulation, 
point to a future where public discourse and public opinion are 
increasingly divided and irreconcilable in ways that make it difficult to 
discuss which policies will bring about a shared vision of society. 
 
